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ABSTRACT 
2020 world economic downturn associated with the restrictions intended to fight COVID-19 
pandemic is a structural recession caused by adverse supply shock. It is similar to recessions caused 
(or aggravated) by post war conversion of defense industries, by oil price shocks (1973, 1979, 
2007), and by the transition to the market in post-communist countries in the 1990s 
(transformational recession). Whereas traditional Keynesian policy (absorption of adverse supply 
shock by means of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy) can help, best results are achieved by 
government industrial policies promoting restructuring – transferring resources (capital and labor) 
from the contracting industries to the expanding. The experience of China and some other East 
Asian countries that seem to be more successful in overcoming the coronavirus recession provides 
additional evidence.  
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The economic recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to become the deepest since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s.  Its magnitude is exceeding the scale of the Great Recession of 
2008-09. Many economists have already suggested that COVID-19 global crisis will give an 
additional push to the growing state involvement into economic and social life. In words of Dani 
Rodrik, “there is nothing like a pandemic to highlight markets’ inadequacy in the face of collective-
action problems and the importance of state capacity to respond to crises and protect people” 
(Rodrik, 2020).  
 
One area where the greater state involvement is desirable and likely, is the use of industrial policy 
as the anticyclical tool for fighting the downturns. This recession is different from most of the 
postwar recessions – it is caused by the supply shock, not by the demand shock, and the policies 
to bring the economy back to the equilibrium with full employment should differ from traditional 
Keynesian fiscal and monetary stimuli.  
 
East Asian countries, especially China, seem to be doing better than the others not only in fighting 
the pandemic, but also in overcoming economic recession. Their experience in economic policy 
making may be no less valuable than in the public health domain.  
 
Deeper than the Great Recession 
 
The postwar economic recessions were very mild – on an annual basis US GDP did not fall more 
than 1 to 2 percent. Even in the last recession of 2008-09, which is believed to be very special and 
is even called the Great Recession, the reduction of GDP totaled only 0.1% in 2008 and 2.5% in 
2009 (fig. 1).  
 
The coronavirus recession is likely to cause a greater reduction of GDP. At the time of writing 
(May 2020) the released data for the first quarter of 2020 showed a 3.5% decline at annual rate in 
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the EU, 4,8% in the US and 6.8% in China. GDP in Hubei province (Wuhan, where the virus was 
first detected, is the capital) fell by nearly 40% (!) And in all other 33 administrative units of China 
(except only Tibet) the GDP in the first quarter fell as well. Chinese economy, however, started to 
recover already in March, so the second quarter is likely to be better than the first, whereas in 
Europe and the United States the major reduction of output is expected in the second quarter and 
may be even afterwards.   
 
Figure 1. US GDP annual growth rates, % 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators database.  
 
If the reduction of output in major Western countries in 2020 will total 5 to 10%, this will be the 
deepest recession of the postwar period and could be compared with the Great Depression of the 
1930s. The US GDP at that time fell for full 4 years in a row and in 1933 was about 30% lower 
than in 1929. It recovered to the pre-recession 1929 level only in 1936, but then fell in the recession 
of 1937-38 (fig. 2).   
 
Unemployment rate in the US in the postwar period never exceeded 10% of the labor force (fig. 
3), whereas at the end of the Great Depression it exceeded 20% of the labor force (fig. 3). In April 
2020 the US unemployment rate rose to 14.7% and was expected to rise even more in May.  
 
However, the nature of the 2020 coronavirus recessions is very different from that of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and of most postwar recessions.  
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Figure 2. 
 
Figure 3.  
 
Source: Unemployment in the United States (Wikipedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unemployment_in_the_United_States).  
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Typology of recessions  
 
Economists distinguish between demand driven recession and supply side recession. The former 
is due to the shocks of demand – for instance, entrepreneurs decide to cut their investment on 
whatever reason, or foreign countries stop purchases of national products, so exports goes down, 
or households decide to postpone purchases of consumer durables. The government in this case 
can step in to stimulate effective demand through the expansionary fiscal and monetary policy – 
this is the standard recommendation of the Keynesian stabilization policy  
 
A supply side recession is usually associated with the increase in costs of production (wage 
increases, increase in prices of imported materials, extra costs due to unfortunate events, such as 
earthquakes, epidemics, wars, etc., creating bottlenecks in supplies and raising the costs of 
production and delivery). A particular case of the supply side recession is a structural recession 
caused by the need to reallocate resources, labor and capital, from one industry/region to another 
(Popov, 2009).   
 
The textbook theoretical framework is the AS-AD model (see, for instance, Mankiw, 2006). The 
AS curve characterizes positive relationship between output and prices (the higher the prices, the 
larger the supply of goods), whereas AD curve characterizes the negative relationship between the 
demand for goods and prices.  
 
The demand is the aggregate demand; it could be increased by the expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policy (AD moves to the right). The supply is the aggregate supply; in the long run the 
AS curve is vertical (given full utilization of production capacities and labor and the level of 
productivity), but in the short run AS curve is positively sloped (firms respond to growing prices 
by expanding output and employment, but eventually this causes wages to increase, so costs catch 
up with growing prices and output returns to the equilibrium level).  
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The negative demand shock moves the AD curve to the left, as shown on figure 4 below. Luckily, 
the government and the central bank can respond to the shock by expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policy, and can return the AD curve back at its initial position, as shown in fig. 4.  
 
Figure 4.   Demand and supply shocks and government reaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is an agreement among economists that the Great Depression of the 1930s was caused by 
the demand factors (the debate is whether it was poor monetary or fiscal policy that failed to put 
back the AD curve).  
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The negative supply shock moves the AS curve to the left (adverse supply shock). Increase in costs 
force the entrepreneurs to increase prices to compensate for increased costs, but at higher prices 
they can sell less output (so the AS curve moves to the left). The government does not have the 
powers to affect the position of the supply curve in the short run. The only thing the authorities 
can do to restore output is to increase aggregate demand (moving the AD curve to the right, 
restoring output at a cost of higher prices – fig. 4). This is called the absorption of the adverse 
supply shock.  
 
 Structural and general recessions  
 
A general recession is the output decline in most industries (sectors, regions), whereas a structural 
recession is the fall in output in one industry/sector/region, which is not compensated immediately 
by the increase in output in another industry/sector/region. Structural recession – the one that is 
caused by the decline of one (non-competitive) sector and the rise of another (competitive) sector 
– would not be a recession at all, if the transfer of resources (capital and labor) from the first sector 
to the second sector would be instant and effortless. But in reality such a transfer of resources is 
associated with higher costs (retraining of employees, replacement of fixed capital stock), so the 
structural recession (whatever the initial reasons are – supply or demand shock) becomes a typical 
supply-side recession (Popov, 2009). The characteristic feature of the structural recession is the 
existence of unemployment and unloaded production capacities in some industries and the good 
profit opportunities in the other industries; resources eventually flow from the former to the latter 
industries.  
 
Not all supply side recessions are structural. Imagine that workers ask for higher wages in all 
regions and industries, so that profits contract by the same amount in all companies, so they fire 
employees and cut output. When unemployment grows, real wages fall, profits increase and output 
is gradually restored to the previous level. Then there is a general supply-side recession and a 
recovery without the reallocation of capital and labor from one sector (industry, region) to another.  
 
This is true with respect to demand side recessions as well. There may be a fall in demand for the 
products of particular industry and then there is a need to reallocate resources from this industry 
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to the other sectors (structural recession). But one could imagine a demand-driven recession, 
caused by absolutely even contraction of demand for all products (say, due to the excess tightening 
of monetary policy) – in this case we have a temporary decline in output (and prices) that comes 
to an end as wages fall and the previous profit rate is restored at the new (lower) level of prices 
and wages. So, there may be recessions, supply-driven and demand-driven, not associated with the 
need to reallocate resources between sectors.  
 
The important difference between the general and structural recession is that in the former case 
there is no need to reallocate resources, so there is no need for new investment. First, universal 
across industries contraction of output occurs, so that there is unemployment and unloaded 
production capacities; later, during recovery, employment and capacity utilization rates increase 
universally across industries.  
 
Of course, every recession is a mixture of the two, but it should be possible to isolate the structural 
and general components in the de facto trajectories of decline and recovery of output. This in turn 
opens for door for the recession diagnostics. For instance, it is known that recessions in post-
communist countries were mostly structural supply side – due to changes in relative prices after 
deregulation (Popov, 2000; 2007). The appropriate (inappropriate) government policies could have 
eased (aggravated) this structural recession. It has been argued, for instance, that the impact of 
demand-side factors (excessively tight demand management) on output decline in Poland has been 
much more pronounced than the impact of supply-side factors (Rosati, 1994).  
 
In the course of economic development structural shifts happen all the time. An example is the 
transition from producing musical records to cassette tapes, and then CDs, DVDs, iPods, and 
smartphones – all due to the introduction of new and better audio techniques. If these shifts are 
gradual and small scale, they do not cause a recession. But when a necessity emerges for a sudden 
large scale structural shift, there may very well be a recession because time and efforts are needed 
to reallocate resources from vanishing to emerging industries –  industrial output contraction in 
outgoing industries is not immediately compensated by production increase in newly emerging 
industries.  
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The infamous “cotton famine” crisis of the 1860s in Britain is a perfect example of such a structural 
recession. Due to the Union blockade of the Confederacy during the Civil War in the US raw 
cotton from the Southern US states stopped flowing freely into Britain and prices of cotton 
increased by several hundred percent. Textile industry of Lancashire, the backbone of British 
industry at the time, faced with increased costs, experienced sharp downturn, total British GDP 
fell, and in 1862 was over 6% lower as compared to 1860 (Maddison, 2018). 
 
Another example is the postwar recessions, associated with the conversion of defense industries. 
They occurred when defense production after the war was curtailed, but defense industries could 
not have been quickly converted to the production of non-defense goods. In the US after the 
Second World War GDP was going down for 3 years (1945-47) and in 1947 was 13% lower than 
in 1944 (BEA, 2012). This is clearly visible at the fig. 2 – productivity decline in 1944-47 was the 
deepest after the Great Depression of the 1930s.  
 
Recent recessions in Western countries associated with oil price peaks in 1973, 1979, and 2007 
are examples of poorly managed structural shifts. In a market economy, the adjustment occurs 
through an increase in unemployment: industries that become unprofitable due to increased costs, 
lay off workers, growing unemployment contributes to a fall in wages, and only later cheap labor 
costs make it profitable to expand production in other industries. One could imagine government 
policies designed to make domestic price changes for fuel and energy very gradual, so that energy 
consuming enterprises could adjust by switching to energy saving technologies without cutting 
output; or special subsidies to companies to facilitate “green restructuring”. But without 
government assistance in stretching the transition period and providing stimuli for new investment, 
structural shifts may be difficult, painful, and costly.  
 
Transformation recession in post-communist countries in the 1990s 
 
The transformational recession that occurred in post-communist economies in the 1990s is another 
example of poor management of structural shifts (Popov, 2000; 2006; 2007). These involved the 
decline of agriculture and manufacturing and the rise of services (trade and finance) and resource 
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industries. In many of these countries, the reduction of output during this transition was deeper 
than the one that occurred in the Great Depression of the 1930s (fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig. 5.  GDP change in former Soviet republics, 1989 = 100%  
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report for various years.  
 
 
The schematic model of the transformational recession is presented in Popov, 2000 and 2007 and 
is briefly described below. Imagine, there are two sectors in an economy – oil and machinery – the 
former is efficient and competitive, while the latter is inefficient. In a centrally planned economy 
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prices were set at such levels that both sectors were profitable. Immediate deregulation of prices 
results in the change of relative prices – terms of trade deteriorate for machinery and improve for 
oil industry. Consequently, machinery sector immediately stops producing (output of machinery 
falls to zero) and resources (capital and labor) from this sector are moved to more profitable oil 
sector. However, the speed of resource reallocation is not infinite; new investment in the oil sector 
in a given time period (say, 1 year) can create only a fraction of jobs needed for workers moving 
from machinery sector enterprises that are being shut down. It will take a number of years for oil 
output to increase so that it is higher than the total output of machinery and oil industries combined 
before transformation.  
 
On the other hand, if prices are deregulated gradually, so that only part of enterprises in machinery 
sector becomes unprofitable every year (say the oldest and most inefficient enterprises will go out 
of business first, while more efficient but still less competitive by world standards will go bankrupt 
only after the second, third, etc. rounds of price deregulation), then the reduction of output in 
machinery sector could be constantly compensated by the increase in output of oil industry. The 
best trajectory1, of course, is the one with such a speed of deregulation that leads to the reduction 
of output in the non-competitive sector at a natural rate, i.e. as its fixed capital stock retires in the 
absence of new investment.  
 
The example illustrates that there is a limit to the speed of reallocating capital from non-
competitive to competitive industries, which is determined basically by the net investment/GDP 
ratio (gross investment minus retirement of capital stock in the competitive industries, since in 
non-competitive industries the retiring capital stock should not be replaced anyway). It is not 
reasonable to wipe away output in non-competitive industries faster than capital is being 
transferred to more efficient industries (Popov, 2006).  
 
The collapse of output in the 1990s in post-communist countries of Eastern Europe and former 
Soviet republics is exactly this type of structural supply-side recession. It is likely to become a 
                                                          
1
 Two trajectories of the dynamics of output are shown at the graph in (Popov, 2006) under the assumption that 
machinery sector accounts in the year “0” for 20% of total output. 
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textbook example: an excessive speed of change in relative prices required the magnitude of 
restructuring that was simply non-achievable with the limited pool of investment2. Up to half of 
reforming economies was made non-competitive overnight due to the change in relative prices 
after deregulation. Output in these non-competitive industries was falling for several years and fell 
in some cases to virtually zero, whereas the growth of output in competitive industries was 
constrained, among other factors, by the limited investment potential and was not strong enough 
to compensate for the output loss in the inefficient sectors.   
 
Hence, at least one general conclusion from the experience of transition economies appears to be 
relevant for the reform process in all countries: provided that reforms create a need for 
restructuring (reallocation of resources), the speed of reforms should be such that the magnitude 
of required restructuring does not exceed the investment potential of the economy.  
 
The speed of adjustment and restructuring in every economy is limited, if only due to the limited 
investment potential needed to reallocate capital stock. This is the main rationale for gradual, rather 
than instant, phasing out of tariff and non-tariff barriers, of subsidies and other forms of 
government support of particular sectors (it took nearly 10 years for the European Economic 
Community and for NAFTA to abolish tariffs).  
 
The collapse of output during transition can be best explained as adverse supply shock caused 
mostly by a change in relative prices after their deregulation due to distortions in industrial 
structure and trade patterns accumulated during the period of central planning (additional adverse 
supply shock came from the collapse of state institutions), while the speed of liberalization, to the 
extent it was endogenous, i.e. determined by political economy factors, had an adverse effect on 
performance. In contrast, at the recovery stage the ongoing liberalization starts to affect growth 
positively, whereas the impact of pre-transition distortions disappears. Institutional capacity and 
reasonable macroeconomic policy, however, continue to be important prerequisites for successful 
performance (Popov, 2007). Not surprisingly, 25 years after the start of the transition the list of 
                                                          
2 The second major adverse supply shock during transition was associated with the decline of the institutional 
capacity of the state (weaker enforcement of contracts, property rights, etc. – see Popov, 2000, 2007 for details), 
but this was not a structural recession in a strict sense of the word because the shock affected all industries and 
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countries that exceeded the pre-recession level of output of 1989 included a lot of procrastinators 
in terms of economic liberalization: in addition to 5 central European countries and Estonia, there 
were also Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus not to speak 
about China and Vietnam (fig. 5). 
 
Uzbekistan is a particularly telling case. Its transformational recession was less deep than in all 
other FSU countries, and its dynamics of output was better than in any other former Soviet republic 
in the 1990s.  Today its output as compared to the base of 1989 is higher than anywhere else in 
post-communist world except for China, Vietnam, and Turkmenistan (fig. 5). Whereas 
Turkmenistan’s exceptional performance was based on good management of gas rent, Uzbekistan 
success was due to its ability to replicate Chinese and Vietnamese gradual transition and export-
oriented growth strategy.  After high inflation of the early 1990s, Uzbekistan carried out prudent 
macroeconomic policy, prevented the national currency from appreciation and carried out active 
industrial policy promoting important structural shifts. It moved resources from cotton production 
(virtually monoculture in Soviet times) into food, gas and auto industry (Popov, 2013; Chowdhury, 
Popov, 2016).  
 
In the case of the coronavirus recession the choice of slowing down the speed of the resource 
transfer and promoting gradual restructuring instead of the immediate shutdown of some 
industries/enterprises is not available – travel and hospitality sectors at the very least need to be 
shut down immediately to save lives, so stretching the shutdown of these sectors in time was never 
seriously considered as a viable option.  But other measures – promoting and helping businesses 
to transfer resources into new activities – could be useful.  
 
How to Deal with Structural Recession 
 
In case of the structural recession traditional Keynesian stimuli – fiscal and monetary expansion – 
may be helpful only to the extent. Increase in government purchases of particular goods and 
services should lead to the increase in prices and, perhaps, an increase in production. In theory, the 
slump in travel, tourism, public catering and hotel businesses could be overcome by expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policy at the price of higher inflation. But the necessary precondition for the 
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multiplier process to unfold is the existence of unloaded production capacities and unemployment. 
The demand stimuli that are enacted simultaneously with the supply prohibitions for many 
businesses can result only in price increases. As Paul Romer and Alan Garber write, “loan 
guarantees and direct cash transfers will stave off bankruptcy and default on debt, but these 
measures cannot restore the output that is lost when social distancing keeps people from producing 
goods and services” (Romer and Garber, 2020).  
 
A quicker and more efficient solution is the elimination of “bottlenecks” –  supply constraints –  
by assisting and even carrying out mandatory reallocations of labor and capital. In case of corona 
virus pandemic, from all facilities affected by the epidemic prohibitions (travel, tourism, retail 
trade, sports events, restaurants, entertainment, schools, and universities, etc.) to facilities of public 
health, medical supplies production, emergencies and public order activities. 
 
It is irrational to have unemployment side by side to the shortage of labor force needed to produce 
medical protective equipment and/or, like it happened in Europe, unemployment together with the 
shortage of agricultural workers for seasonal activities (these workers previously were usually 
coming to more developed countries from less developed countries, but encountered difficulties 
crossing national borders in spring 2020). For the future structure of the economy that is likely to 
involve less recreation services (restaurants, hotels, travel, etc.) the current coronavirus crisis 
should be seen as an opportunity to make much needed investment into the personnel retraining 
and capacity building in the health care systems making them truly universal and able to prevent 
and cope with any epidemics and pandemics.  
 
Quite a few successful examples of managing structural shifts can be found in East Asia where 
collective interests are a high priority and governments are not afraid to resort to market 
intervention and direct investment financing in times of crisis.  This intervention came in the form 
of the industrial policy, sometimes carried out through economic stimuli and sometimes even via 
heavy handed direct administrative orders. In China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) and South 
East Asian countries it was obviously facilitated by the lessons of the SARS 2002-04 epidemic 
and restructuring of the health care systems carried out afterwards.  
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In China, the production of protective masks increased from 15 million a day in early February 
2020 to over 100 million a day by the end of the same month! Over 3,000 enterprises that 
previously had nothing to do with the supply of healthcare products began producing masks, 
protective suits, sanitizers, and other hygiene goods. Several major companies began to make 
masks at their enterprises: China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, China National Machinery 
Industry Corporation, and the major auto manufacturers Shanghai GM Wuling, Guangzhou 
Automobile Group, and BYD.  
 
The South Korean Ministry of Food and Drug Safety gave emergency approval to the company 
Seegene to mass produce a coronavirus test kit that it had developed in 3 weeks. All of its 395 
employees dropped all other work and focused on making the test kits, with molecular biologists 
and senior scientists working at the assembly line. 
 
The Vietnamese Vingroup was reported to be able to convert its automobile and smartphone 
factories in a period of 3 months into the production of 55,000 medical ventilators per month. The 
total stock of the US ventilators in March 2020 was estimated at 62,000 new and about 100,000 
old; the total number of the UK ventilators at a time was 21,000.  
 
In Western countries in times of war, non-defense industries were converted into the production 
of defense items. In most countries, this happened with state assistance, which eased and sped the 
transition. Before and during World War II, governments normally increased taxes and borrowings 
and used the proceeds to purchase weapons. In the United States, the increase in defense 
procurements after the recession of 1937-38 caused a boom — economic growth went from 
negative values in 1938 to 17-20 percent growth annually in 1941-43. Never before and never after 
the American economy was growing that fast.  
 
Even better results have been exhibited by centrally planned economies, which have clear 
advantages over market economies in mobilizing domestic savings and converting them into 
investment and in promoting structural shifts quickly and with full employment. In the 1930s-40s 
on the eve of and during World War II, the USSR transferred huge resources from agriculture to 
industry, from light to heavy industry, and from non-defense to defense industries. In 1940, 
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Germany produced two times more steel and more defense output than the Soviet Union, but 
already by 1943, the USSR had surpassed Germany in the production of tanks, aircraft, and 
artillery guns. This structural shift was the most crucial reason that changed the course of the war.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The nature of coronavirus recession is a supply side shock requiring structural shifts to overcome 
it – transfer of capital and labor from temporary closed travel, hospitality and other affected by 
administrative restrictions industries to other sectors, mostly to public health and safety. The ability 
of countries to move resources rapidly from non-health to health-related industries is a crucial 
factor not only for fighting the epidemics, but also in fighting the recession. For the market 
mechanism to work, the increase in government orders for the ventilators should produce an 
increase in prices that is large enough to cover the costs of conversion, and to ensure higher 
profitability to compensate for the risk – only then one can expect that enterprises will introduce 
second and third shifts to expand their production of ventilators at the specialized plants and will 
make investment into the conversion of non-profile capacities into the production of ventilators.   
 
The faster and more efficient alternative – enactment of legislations (such as Defense Production 
Act) to force private enterprises to switch to the production of needed equipment, no matter what 
are prices and costs. An extreme example of forced reallocation of resources is the labor armies 
created by Soviet Russia in 1920 (often employed between battles). Such labor armies are hardly 
possible today, but betting only on market forces to ensure equilibrium is a suboptimal approach.  
 
The capacity to cope with the current coronavirus recession depends to a large extent on how 
governments will assist markets in carrying out structural shifts. As the world economy enters into 
a global recession in 2020, it may be prudent for policymakers to promote radical state-
interventionist industrial policy approaches from the constructive Asian cases of the past and 
present.  Encouraging and assisting the transfer of resources from recreation, travel and hospitality 
industries to health care and epidemic prevention facilities may be good not only for overcoming 
the current recession, but also for building stable and resilient economies and social structures of 
the future.  
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